SSL POODLE Attack – What is SCSV and how does it help?

The POODLE vulnerability is currently the hot topic in the security world. Here is a nice technical overview by the Google SSL Guru. POODLE relies on SSLv3, but today nearly every server and client supports at least TLS 1.0 in addition to SSLv3, which means SSLv3 connections should (and in fact are) be rather rare. But there is still a threat because of downgrade compatibility between the protocols. With POODLE, a rather new SSL/TLS enhancement to mitigate protocol downgrade attacks has been mentioned a lot recently.

[Update 2014/12/09]
Recent developments show that the POODLE attack, which originally was only thought to be applicable CBC cipher-suites in SSLv3 connections, can in some cases be extended to TLS1+ (ALL TLS versions) connections as well. This time however, it is not due to a general protocol weakness in TLS, but because of specific flawed software implementations that just ported certain functions from their SSLv3 code over to TLS, without considering the improved CBC padding specifications of TLS.
Currently known to be affected are load balancers from F5 and A10, as well as Cisco devices , some Check point Firewall components and IBM HTTP Server.

TLS Fallback Signaling Cipher Suite Value prevents SSL/TLS protocol downgrades a man-in-the-middle can enforce when both sides actually support higher protocol versions.
For example, a Client sends a Client Hello handshake message that indicates support for TLS 1.2. Normally the server responds with its own highest protocol version in the Server Hello handshake message, and that will be the negotiated SSL/TLS version of the connection. If the server supports TLS 1.2 as well, the connection will use this protocol. If the server supports a lower version, the connection will use this instead (provided the client supports it as well of course).
Now an attacker who is able to intercept and alter traffic between the systems can screw up the handshake process and make it fail with arbitrary network errors (think: TCP RST). In this case the client often retries the connection with a lower initial SSL/TLS protocol version, say SSLv3 or TLS1, which makes it easier for the bad guy to attack the encrypted channel.

To prevent this kind of protocol downgrade attack, TLS Fallback SCSV was developed. Here’s a short overview of how it works:
Both, the client and server need to support it to make it work. TLS Fallback SCSV is used as a signaling cipher suite (TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV, value 0x5600) during the handshake. A signaling cipher suite does not provide actual encryption algorithms like other, “normal” cipher suites such as “TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA” or “TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256or others. Instead they are used as simple protocol controls, similar to TLS extensions. A client can include the “TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV” cipher suite in his Client Hello message to tell the server, that the connection should only be established if the highest protocol version supported by the server is identical to or lower than that of what it sees in the Client Hello. So if the server supports TLS 1.2 but the Client Hello uses SSL3, TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1, then the server should respond with an “inappropriate fallback”  TLS alert message.
The nitty gritty details of SCSV can be read in the IETF draft.
Note that TLS Fallback SCSV really only helps against protocol downgrade attacks, and does not actually prevent the POODLE attack by itself. POODLE is a vulnerability in SSL3, and SCSV makes it harder for the attacker to downgrade a connection to it in order to exploit that vulnerability.

Here is an example of a failed handshake between a TLS 1.2 server supporting SCSV and a client using TLS 1.1 supporting SCSV:downgrade

Wireshark doesn’t know about this cipher suite yet so it lists it as unknown. The TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV” signaling cipher suite is a similar safety guard to prevent an older session renegotiation vulnerability.

In contrast, this handshake completes normally with SCSV since the client supports TLS 1.2:sslnormal

You can test whether a server supports SCSV with a recent openssl version and the -fallback_scsv option. For this to work you must tell openssl to use an older protocol version than what the server actually supports via the -ssl3, -tls1 or -tls1_1 flags. If the server supports SCSV, it will terminate the connection with a TLS alert.
Here’s an example with and a Google mailserver, which both support TLS 1.2 and SCSV:

$ openssl s_client -connect -state -fallback_scsv -tls1_1
3072415468:error:1409443E:SSL routines:SSL3_READ_BYTES:tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback:s3_pkt.c:1257:SSL alert number 86
3072415468:error:1409E0E5:SSL routines:SSL3_WRITE_BYTES:ssl handshake failure:s3_pkt.c:596

$ openssl s_client -connect -state -fallback_scsv -starttls smtp -tls1_1 
3072067308:error:1409443E:SSL routines:SSL3_READ_BYTES:tlsv1 alert inappropriate fallback:s3_pkt.c:1257:SSL alert number 86
3072067308:error:1409E0E5:SSL routines:SSL3_WRITE_BYTES:ssl handshake failure:s3_pkt.c:596:

Changing the above to use TLS 1.2 instead will result in successful connections:
$ openssl s_client -connect -state -fallback_scsv -tls1_2
$ openssl s_client -connect -state -fallback_scsv -starttls smtp -tls1_2

The SSL Labs online test will also tell you if your server supports SCSV.

If you use an Apache webserver with mod_ssl and one of the recent openssl versions, it should already support SCSV by default. The same goes for my postfix mailserver that depends on openssl and supports SCSV out of the box. I tested this on my own CentOS with openssl-1.0.1e-30.el6_5.2.i686. (Remember, you should restart the services after updating openssl.)

Currently (as of October 2014), of the 3 major browsers only Chrome supports SCSV. Firefox is supposed to add support with version 35, IE does not support it and I’m not aware of any concrete roadmap to include it.

In the meantime, you should seriously consider disabling obsolete SSLv3 on the client and server side of your networks. Firefox will disable SSLv3 by default in Firefox 34 (release November 2014) and Google plans to follow in the next months with Chrome.
SSLv3 is officially dead now.

This is what such an error looks like to the user in Firefox 34 (ESR), when the browser receives a TLS alert from the web server:

TMG “502 Proxy Error. The data is invalid” while downloading Windows 8.1/2012R2 Update KB2919355

Recently I ran into an odd issue when trying to download the KB2919355 Update bundle from Microsoft. The problem affected WSUS and local Windows Update clients that used TMG as their explicit proxy and was reproducible with browsers as well:
The TMG proxy threw 502 Proxy Error ( The data is invalid.  ) when trying to access various different hosts and URLs serving the same update file such as these:

Strange enough the problem did not occur in transparent proxy mode.

I first suspected the problem was related to the issue described here, but in my case neither HTTP compression nor chunked transfer-encoding are used, thus this article and its explanation do not apply.

First let’s have a look at a normal response (bypassing the Proxy/transparent mode). We can see the file is approximately 3.8GiB in size, quite big but I’ve downloaded larger files without issues. There are no strange HTTP headers or anything sent by the servers (goes for GETs as well) and everything looks just fine:

 $ curl -I ''
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Via: 1.1 TMGPROXY01
Connection: Keep-Alive
Proxy-Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Length: 4052160113
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2014 11:12:31 GMT
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
ETag: "0cabe2eb931cf1:0"
Server: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Last-Modified: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 23:36:04 GMT
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X-CID: 2

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